Empirical research has established that there is signi…cant dispersion in prices charged by retail outlets for seemingly homogeneous goods. 1 Indeed, price dispersion appears to be pervasive in that it is observed in markets with very di¤erent structures.
The objective here is to investigate the way in which the underlying structure of the market can a¤ect equilibrium price distributions.
A relatively large literature attempts to explain how price distributions can arise as part of a market equilibrium. In search models 2 The Burdett and Judd (1983) model of noisy search di¤ers somewhat. When both consumers and …rms are homogeneous, the unique equilibrium is characterized by a continuous distribution of price o¤ers. This paper illustrates the ‡exibility of BurdettJudd approach. We consider a market structure with one large …rm having multiple outlets and a competitive fringe consisting of many small …rms each with a single outlet. Single outlet …rms o¤er a continuous distribution of prices, and the multiple outlet …rm, the recognized market leader, o¤ers the highest price in the market. Not surprisingly, market power generates higher average prices, making consumers worse o¤. Prices at the multiple outlet …rm tend to be higher than prices charged if there were only single outlet …rms. The high price from the market leader confers bene…ts 1 on all outlets.
The market structure considered here has become part of the standard 'tool-kit' in industrial organization (Carlton and Perlo¤, 1999, p. 63-65, 107-118) . There are, of course, a wide variety of additional settings and topics. The more general message here is that the broad framework o¤ers a ‡exible and robust platform on which to study many other classical problems in industrial organization.
The Framework
Suppose there is a …xed continuum of consumers and retail outlets. One large …rm has proportion of all outlets and many small …rms have a single outlet each.
All outlets sell a homogeneous, indivisible good. A consumer who purchases at price p; enjoys utility z p: Before the market opens, each …rm posts a price which cannot be changed once set. The marginal cost of production is constant. Without loss of generality, assume marginal cost is zero.
All large …rm outlets o¤er the same price -x: Let F (p) denote the probability a single outlet …rm o¤ers a price no greater than p: Further, let p`and p h indicate the in…mum and supremum of the support of F with z p h p` 0 for any F .
As distributions with mass points will be considered, the following notation convention is used. Given distribution function F; assume for any p
where (p) indicates the mass of …rms o¤ering price p; if such a mass exists. If (p) = 0 for all p; the distribution is said to be continuous.
Consumers search over prices to maximize expected utility from purchasing the good net of search costs, c > 0. A consumer observes one o¤er with probability 1 and two o¤ers with probability : An observed price is the realization of an independent draw from all prices on o¤er. There is no recall of previously rejected o¤ers. Neither …rms nor consumers discount the future.
This type of search has been termed noisy search and can be motivated as follows.
In an attempt to …nd a low price, the consumer pays a cost to observe a price, say by visiting a store. After visiting this store and observing the price, with probability this consumer meets a friend who has contacted another store and observed a di¤erent price. If this meeting occurs, the friends exchange information by informing each other of the price o¤ered and location of each store visited. The consumer then either purchases from one of these two stores, or pays c and searches again. If a friend is not contacted, the consumer either purchases from the store visited, or search continues.
Single Outlet Firms
A given outlet cannot in ‡uence the number of buyers it contacts -consumers search randomly. Hence, a …rm maximizes expected pro…ts by maximizing expected pro…t per consumer visit. Suppose for the moment all …rms expect consumers to use e¤ective reservation price R > 0. Each single outlet …rm takes as given three objects -the price o¤ered by the multiple outlet …rm, x; the e¤ective reservation price of consumers, R; and the distribution of prices made by other single outlet …rms, F:
Given random search, the …rm's expected pro…t per potential customer when it o¤ers price p R can be written as
where denotes the probability the consumer contacted is one who has only observed one price that period. Note that (pjR; x; F ) = 0; for p > R:
A market equilibrium is de…ned later. Nevertheless, it will be useful to specify an important element of it at this point. In an equilibrium we require that for given (R; x); 0 < x R; there exists a single outlet price distribution (SP D), F; such that
It is possible to restrict the class of distributions functions that can be a SP D.
Proof: R > 0 implies that for any given F; when 0 < < 1; …rms can obtain strictly positive expected pro…ts per customer. Hence, no …rm charges p = 0:
3 Assume in equilibrium F has a mass at p 0 > 0: In this case
Clearly, if a …rm o¤ers price p 0 "; " > 0; then
and therefore a contradiction completes the proof.
Given Claim 1, (1) can be written as
The object now is to demonstrate that for given (R; x); 0 < x R; there exists a unique SP D. Claim 2 …rst establishes that at any SP D the supremum of the support is either, p h = R; or p h = x: This result along with (3) can be used to establish the expected pro…ts at any SP D.
Claim 2: Given (R; x); 0 < x R; suppose F (:jx; R) is the associated SP D (provided one exists).
(a) If F (xjx; R) < 1 and x < R; i.e., if a positive measure of single outlet …rms o¤er a price greater than x; then p h = R and the expected pro…ts of all single outlet …rms is R:
, if a positive measure of single outlet …rms o¤er a price no greater than x; then F (xjx; R) F (x "jx; R) > 0 for all " > 0 small enough. Further, the expected pro…ts of all single outlet …rms is
Proof: Given F (xjx; R) < 1; suppose p h < R: As F (:jx; R) must be continuous, the expected pro…ts of a …rm o¤ering p h is p h : However, a …rm o¤ering price p such that p h < p R obtains expected pro…ts p > p h : This leads to a contraction thereby establishing (a).
Given F (xjx; R) > 0; suppose there exists a p 1 < x such that F (p 1 ) = F (x); i.e., no single outlet …rm o¤ers a price p 1 < p x: The expected pro…ts of a …rm o¤ering price p; where p 1 < p x; can be written as (pjx; R; F (:jx; R)) =
<
:
It follows immediately that (p jx; R; F (:jx; R) ) is strictly increasing in p when p 1 < p < x. This implies there is a contradiction establishing the …rst part of (b). It also follows that
as p ! x: Hence, because F (:jx; R) is a SP D all …rms must make these expected pro…ts.
The next Claim establishes that given R (0 < R z); there exists two numbers, 
Claim 3:
(a) Given R such that 0 < R z; de…ne x(R) by
If x < x(R); there is a unique SP D, F (:jx; R); such that F (xjx; R) = 0; i.e., all single outlet …rms o¤er a price greater than x: Further,
with support [p`; R] such that
(b) Given R such that 0 < R z; de…ne x(R) by
If x > x(R); there is a unique SP D, F (:jx; R); that implies F (xjx; R) = 1;
i.e., all single outlet …rms o¤er a price less than x: Further,
with support [p`; x]; where
Proof: Given (x; R) such that 0 < x < R z; suppose all single outlet …rms o¤er a price greater than x: From Claim 2(a) it follows that all …rms make expected pro…ts R: Suppose a deviant single outlet …rm o¤ers a price p < x: Such a …rm sells to all consumers who visit and therefore obtains expected pro…ts (per potential customer) (p jx; R; F (:jx; R) ) = p for p < x: Hence, the deviation is not pro…table if x < x(R);
where x(R) is de…ned in (4). Given x < x(R); equal expected pro…ts for all single outlet …rms yields
Solving implies that F (:jx; R) satis…es (5) and (6).
Given (x; R) such that 0 < x < R z; suppose all single outlet …rms o¤er a price less than x: From Claim 2(b), it follows that if F is a SP D, then all single outlet …rms make expected pro…ts x[ + (1 ) ]: When will a …rm want to deviate and o¤er a price greater than x? Given x < R; a …rm that o¤ers a price greater than x will o¤er price R and obtain expected pro…ts R: Hence, no single outlet …rm will select to deviate and o¤er a price greater than x if x > x(R); where x(R) is de…ned in (7) . Given x > x(R); equal expected pro…ts for all single outlet …rms yields
for all p on the support of F (:jx; R). Solving implies F (:jx; R) satis…es (8) and (9) . The next step is to characterize the unique SP D for when the multiple outlet …rm charges intermediate prices, i.e., for x between x(R) and x(R). For such an intermediate x; single outlet …rms not surprisingly distribute themselves on either side of the multiple outlet price. However, this distribution contains a gap. There exists a range of prices immediately above x which lead to lower than equilibrium expected pro…ts so that no single outlet …rm sets its price in this region.
Claim 4: For …xed R > 0 (0 < R z); if x 2 (x(R); x(R)); then there exists a unique SP D; such that
indicates the proportion of single outlet …rms o¤ering a price greater than x: Further, the unique SP D, F (:jx; R), can be written as
for e p(x; R) < p R
where
and p`= R
Proof: Given R (0 < R < z); if x(R) < x < x(R)); then we require the expected pro…ts of single outlet …rms o¤ering a price greater than x to be the same as that obtained by those o¤ering a price less than x; i.e.,
Solving implies (x; R) must satisfy (10) . For those single outlet …rms o¤ering a price greater than x; equal pro…ts implies
for all p > x on the support of F (:jx; R): As
this yields e p(x; R) in (12) . Given R in (14) it follows that e p(x; R) > x:
For those single outlet …rms o¤ering a price less than x; equal pro…ts implies
for all p < x on the support of F (:jx; R): Solving for F and then again for p l generates the form of the unique SP D as presented in (11) and (13). Note, F (pjx; R) = F (xjx; R) for all p 2 [x; e p(x; R)]:
The Multiple Outlet Firm
The multiple outlet …rm takes as given the reservation price of consumers, R; and the response of single outlet …rms as represented by the family of SP Ds fF (:jx; R)g 0<x R :
Whatever price the multiple outlet …rm charges, x; the response by single outlet …rms can be described by the unique SP D, F (:jx; R): This speci…cation in e¤ect makes the multiple outlet …rm a market leader that sets its price before single outlet …rms.
At a particular outlet, the multiple outlet …rm's expected pro…ts per potential customer, given R and the family fF (:jx; R)g 0<x R ; is m (x; R) = 8 > > < > > :
where again (x; R) equals the proportion of single outlet …rms o¤ering a price greater than x: It follows
+x (1 )(1 ) @ (x;R) @x for x(R) < x < x(R)
Note, if x < x(R) or x > x(R); the above derivative is strictly positive. Further, if
x(R) < x < x(R); then substituting (10) and its derivative into (16) yields
Clearly, @ 2 m (x; R)=@x 2 < 0: At both x = x(R) and x = x(R); @ m (x; R)=@x is strictly positive and therefore @ m (x; R)=@x > 0 for all x(R) < x < x(R): It follows from inspection that the multiple outlet …rm will maximize its pro…ts by o¤ering price
R:
If n consumers are searching for a low price, then [2 + (1 )]n = (1 + )n is the expected number of o¤ers observed by consumers. It follows that = (1 )=(1 + )
denotes the probability a …rm contacts a consumer who only observes one price (given a contact is made). Therefore, in equilibrium the multiple outlet …rms charge price R; and the distribution of prices charged by the single outlet …rms is given by
where the support of F is [p`; R]
Consumer Behavior
Before discussing consumer behavior, we …rst de…ne an equilibrium De…nition: A market equilibrium is (R ; x ; fF (:jx; R )g 0<x R ); where (a) x maximizes the multiple outlet …rm's expected pro…ts given R and fF (:jx; R )g 0<x R (b) the SP D, F (:jx ; R ); describes the optimal pricing behavior of single outlet …rms, given x and R (c) R is the reservation price of any consumer, given x and F (:jx ; R )
So far we have shown that, given R; equilibrium conditions (a) and (b) are satis…ed when the multiple outlet …rm o¤ers price R; and the equilibrium response of single outlet …rms is given by the SP D, F (:jR; R): Each consumer takes F and x as given. Without loss of generality assume that (a) and (b) are satis…ed and therefore consumers take R and F (:jR; R) as given for some R; where 0 < R z:
As search is random, 9 (a) (1 )(1 ) denotes the probability the consumer receives only one o¤er which is from a single outlet …rm, (b) 2 (1 ) denotes the probability the consumer receives one o¤er from a single outlet …rm and one from the multiple outlet …rm; and (c) (1 ) 2 denotes the probability the consumer receives two independent o¤ers each from a single outlet …rm.
Given the multiple outlet …rm charges price R with probability one, with probability (1 )(1 ) + 2 (1 ) the consumers lowest price observed is a random draw from F (:jR; R); whereas (1 ) 2 indicates the probability the lowest price observed is a random draw from G = 1 (1 F ) 2 : Hence, with probability
the lowest price observed is R: Suppose all …rms expect consumers to use e¤ective reservation price, R; the multiple outlet …rm charges price R; and F (:jR; R) is the SP D: In this case the expected return to a consumer from search can be written as
where Q is the reservation price used that satis…es z Q = V: Integrating by parts and manipulating yields
(pjR; R)dp + (1 )
(pjR; R)dp
As maxfV; z Rg = V + maxfQ R; 0g; we have
(pjR; R)dp + maxfQ R; 0g for any R (0 < R z): In equilibrium we require either Q = R, for some R z; or Q > R; for all R z: De…ne (R) by
(pjR; R)[2 F (pjR; R)]dp
Substituting (8) for F (:jR; R) and performing the relevant integration establishes that
This implies we have a unique equilibrium. Using = (1 )=(1 + ); the following Proposition summarizes what has been established above.
Proposition: There exists a unique equilibrium in which (a) the multiple outlet …rm o¤ers price R ; (b) R satis…es (18) and (c) the distribution of prices o¤ered by single outlet …rms can be written as
Further, consumers utilize reservation price R :
Discussion
Prices are strategic complements. A higher price at any particular outlet increases the expected payo¤ at those outlets with lower prices thereby generating a positive spillover among outlets. As potential competitors raise their prices, an outlet has an increased incentive to raise its own price.
The multiple outlet …rm but not the single outlet …rms takes advantage of its size in this situation. Realizing that with probability it will capture the spillover from a higher price at one of its outlets, the multiple outlet …rm has the incentive to push up the highest price found in the market (relative to the supremum price in the case where there are only single outlet …rms and when R < z). The extent to which this occurs depends on the number of outlets operated by the multiple outlet …rm. For z > c= (1 ) 2 , a larger proportion of outlets in one …rm generates a higher price x at those outlets associated with that …rm.
In the competitive fringe of single outlet …rms, prices also increase with the proportion of outlets in one …rm. The distribution of prices given stochastically dominates the distribution of prices given 0 if and only if < 0 , i.e. F (pjR ; R ) < 0. The relationship between the price distribution and decomposes into two complementary e¤ects. Having more …rms charging the highest price reduces competition in the competitive fringe and hence induces higher prices among these …rms. In addition, if the supremum price increases as well, i.e. z < c= (1 ) 2 ; fringe prices rise accordingly.
More interestingly, the range of prices is non-monotonic in . In particular, if z > c= (1 ) 2 ; i.e. if there exists a su¢ ciently small ; price dispersion (as measured either by the price range between the supremum and the in…mum or by di¤erences in percentile price as discussed above) increases with until R = z: In this case, as increases, the rise of the supremum outstrips the rise in the in…mum. However, once is su¢ ciently large so that the reservation price is limited by the monopoly price, that is, R = z; a higher reduces dispersion. In this case, only the in…mum increases with :
In equilibrium, because the multiple outlet …rm but not single outlet …rms is privately providing a public good (for all outlets) of higher prices, single outlet …rms earn higher expected pro…ts than outlets associated with the market leader. Further note that for z < c= (1 ) 2 outlets, pro…t per potential customer at the outlets of the market leader are independent of : Increasing the number of outlets at the multiple …rm outlet only bene…ts the remaining single outlet …rms.
In this noisy search model, although having one large seller and many small sellers does not alter the fundamental source of price dispersion, it does in ‡uence pricing in interesting ways. More generally, this model illustrates that noisy search can be 12 adapted to address in a consistent manner issues fundamental to industrial economics.
For example, the approach appears well suited for including advertising, the adoption of new technologies, and market entry and exit. The approach could likewise be expanded to other areas such as international trade, as in Alessandria (2004) .
